We presen a secure direct communication protocol by using step-split Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair. In this communication protocol, Alice first sends one qubit of an EPR pair to Bob. Bob sends a receipt signal to Alice through public channel when he receives Alice's first qubit. Alice performs her encoding operations on the second qubit and sends this qubit to Bob. Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement to draw Alice's information. The security of this protocol is based on 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. If Eve want to eavesdrop Alice's information, she has to attack both qubits of the EPR pair, which results in that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. Bob's receipt signal can protect this protocol against the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum channel losses. And this protocol is strictly secure to perform a quantum key distribution by using Calderbank-shor-steane codes.
where |+ >=
(|0 > −|1 >), and |0 >, |1 > are the up and down eigenstate of the σ z . It is well known that such EPR pairs can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval. But these correlations cannot be used for superluminal communication. Consider Alice has an EPR pair in the singlet state |ψ − >. She sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another. Assume both Alice and Bob perform measurement on their qubits in basis B z , B z = {|0 >, |1 >}. When Alice's measurement outcome is |0 >, then she immediately knows Bob's measurement outcome is |1 >. If Alice's measurement outcome is |1 >, then she knows Bob's measurement outcome is |0 >. But whether Alice's measurement outcome is |0 > or |1 > is completely random with a probability p = 0.5. As long as one of them performs a measurement, the state |ψ − > will instantaneously collapse to a product state |0 > A |1 > B or |1 > A |0 > B randomly. The correlations do not exist any longer. So Bob can not get any of Alice's message through these processes. In order to sends message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is needed.
When two qubits (A and B) are in the maximally entangled states |ψ ± > and |φ ± >, each single qubit is in the completely mixed states, ρ
No one can distinguish these states by an experiment performed on only one qubit. In other words, one qubit can be encoded by a local operation but it has a nonlocal effect. Anyone who only access to one of the qubits can not decode the information if he has no access to the other qubit. Suppose Alice has an EPR pair in the state |ψ − >. She sends one qubit (we call it 'the first qubit') to Bob and keeps another. When Bob receives the first qubit, he sends a signal to Alice through public channel (we call this as Bob's receipt). If Alice receives Bob's receipt, she then performs an encoding operation U on her qubit and then sends this qubit (we call this qubit as 'the second qubit') to Bob. Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement on two qubits to decode Alice's information. Alice's encoding operation U can be described by
These four operations can transform the state |ψ − > into |ψ − >, |ψ + >, |φ − >, and |φ + >, respectively. These operations respectively correspond to the code 00, 01, 10, 11. To ensure the security of this communication, a check mode is needed. When Alice receives Bob's receipt, instead of her encoding operation, she performs a measurement in the basis B z = {|0 >, |1 >} or B x = {|+ >, |− >)} randomly. Then she tells her measurement outcome to Bob. Bob also performs a measurement in the same basis as Alice used. If both outcomes coincide, they known that Eve is in line. This communication stops. Else, Alice prepares next EPR pair. This protocol an explicit described like an algorithm.
(1) Alice prepares an EPR pair in state |ψ − >.
(2) Alice sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another. Security proof . Since ρ ± A := tr B {|ψ ± >< ψ ± |} = tr B {|φ ± >< φ ± |}, Eve can not distinguish each Bell state if she only attack one qubit of the EPR pair, i.e., Eve can not get any information if she only attack the second qubit. Because Alice decides to perform check measurement only after Bob received the first qubit, the security proof has to assure Eve's any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. To gain Alice's information, Eve has to attack both qubits of the EPR pair. Suppose after Eve's first attack, the state Alice and Bob shared becomes ρ. The information Eve can gain from ρ is bounded by the Holevo quantity χ(ρ) [18] . Because Holevo quantity decreases under quantum operations [18, 19] , the mutual information Eve can gain after Alice's encoding operation is determined by χ(ρ). From
we know S(ρ) is the upper bound of χ(ρ). 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. The fidelity [20] of state |ψ − > and ρ is
Let us assume that
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore, the entropy of ρ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with diagonal entries 1 − γ,
. And the entropy of ρ max is
So S(ρ max ) is a upper bound of the information Eve can gain from ρ. Let us discuss the connection between the information Eve can gain and the detection probability d. In check mode, when Alice and Bob share the state |φ ± >, their measurement outcomes will coincide every time when they use the measurement basis B z . When the state they shared is |ψ + >, their measurement outcomes will coincide every time when they use the measurement basis B x . If and only if the state they shared is |ψ − >, their measurement results will never coincide. Since F (|ψ − >, ρ) 2 = 1 − γ, then the detection probability is d ≥ γ/2. From equation (9) we know when γ = 0, i.e., Eve does not eavesdrop the communication, the detection probability d = 0. When γ > 0, i.e., Eve can gain some of Alice's information, she has to face a nonzero risk d > 0 to be detected. When γ = 3 4 , it has S(ρ max ) = 2, which implies that Eve has a chance to eavesdrop full of Alice's information. In fact, Eve can reach this upper bound. She replaces Alice's first qubit with one of her own and forwards it to Bob. When she receives the seconds qubit, she performs a Bell-basis measurement on both qubits to draw full of Alice's information. On this occasion, the detection rate is d ≥ Eve can attack the communication without eavesdropping [21] . She only attack the second qubit to destroy the communication. In this case, Eve can not gain Alice's information. After Alice's encoding operation, Eve captures the second qubit and performs a measurement in the basis B x or B z on it, which makes the state of the EPR pair collapse to a product state. Eve also can perform a unitary operation on the second qubit. She can performs the operation U 01 , U 10 , or U 11 on every second qubit to attack the communication. Then Eve forwards the seconds qubit to Bob. When the communication is terminated, Bob has learned nothing but a sequence of nonsense random bits. Alice and Bob can use a message authentification method to protect the communication against Eve's denial-of-service attack with a reliable public channel [21] .
Consider that the quantum channel is noisy. Noise in quantum channel will introduce qubit losses and qubit errors. In a noisy quantum channel, Eve's eavesdropping may be hidden in the quantum channel losses. In our communication protocol, Bob sends a receipt in every run. Without this signal, quantum channel losses may be used by Eve to eavesdrop Alice's information [22] . Eve can keeps the first qubit for a time. If Alice publish her measurement outcome, Eve then forwards the first qubit to Bob. Else, Eve receives the second qubit and performs a Bell-basis measurement to draw Alice's information. Thus, such eavesdropping can be hidden in the quantum channel losses without Bob's receipt signal. Alice and Bob can use the message authentification method to detect Eve's eavesdropping hidden in qubit error. If Alice and Bob find the error rate is higher than they desired, they abandon this communication. With a low noise channel, Alice and Bob can use Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [23] to complete a perfect secure communication. In this way, our protocol is similar to the modified Lo-Chau protocol [24] . It is strictly secure to complete a key distribution.
In summary, we present a secure direct quantum communication based on step-split EPR pair. In principle, this protocol allows quasisecure direct communication and secure QKD. In practice, the storage of one photon is necessary for a duration corresponding to the distance between Alice and Bob [25] . Today, the Bell state of an EPR photons can be created by parametric down − conversion. And the complete Bell type measurement is also been demonstrated [26] . The values of σ x , σ y , and σ z of a qubit of an single photon can be ascertained [27] . With current technologies, the experimental realization of the protocol is feasible with relative small effort.
